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This study examines the association between voluntary disclosure and investment constraints via 
a regulatory change in disclosure−Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) − which pins down a point 
of time that firms have to change their disclosure policy.  Reg FD prevents managers from 
releasing material information to only a selected group.  In the post Reg FD period (Post-FD), 
some firms have chosen to replace selective disclosure with non-disclosure.  We find that these 
silent firms’ capital investments are more constrained post-FD, relative to firms that have chosen 
to replace selective disclosure with public disclosure.  The association is stronger for firms that are 
ex-ante financially constrained, have greater growth opportunities, have less analyst following, 
and are harder to access the debt market. The results are robust to alternative model specifications 
and endogenous switching estimation approach. Our finding that disclosure policy is related to 
investment is relevant to both market participants and regulators when evaluating disclosure 
regulation. 
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Firms’ Disclosure Policy and Capital Investment: Evidence from Regulation Fair 
Disclosure 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the association between voluntary disclosure and investment 
constraints via a regulatory change in disclosure.  If the information asymmetry between managers 
and the external capital markets is severe, the cost of external financing will be high, and the firm’s 
capital investment, which are highly correlated with its internal cash flow and investment, will be 
likely restricted (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & Poterba, 1988).  Extensive research has 
documented the consequences of financial constraints on capital investment (e.g., Campello, 
Graham, & Harvey, 2010; Chaney, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2012; Fazzari et al., 1988; Tan, 2010). For 
example, Tan (2010) documents that financially constrained firms become cautious in capital 
spending, which creates long periods of underinvestment, whereas unconstrained firms are less 
affected. Consistently, Campello et al. (2010) confirms that constrained firms plan deeper cuts in 
technology spending, employment, and capital spending.  Although the disclosure of material 
information can alleviate the severity of information problems between a firm and outside capital 
providers (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Stein, 2003; Verrecchia, 1983)1, few 
studies have directly examined whether a change in disclosure policy is associated with 
corresponding changes in investment.  Examining such a question can be complex because 
disclosure policy and investment activities are often determined concurrently within a firm.  In this 
study, we focus on an external shock to the disclosure environment that pins down a point of time 
                                                 
1 Researchers document that greater disclosure is associated with tighter bid–ask spreads (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Welker, 1995), lower costs of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002), and higher realized growth 
rates (Khurana, Pereira, & Martin, 2006). 
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when a change in a firm’s disclosure policy occurs.  The observations of this study will provide a 
good opportunity to examine the associated investment change. 
We choose the regulatory change that externally affects a firm’s disclosure environment: 
Reg FD, which took effect on October 23, 2000, and was designed to prohibit selective disclosure 
wherein firms disclose material information to selected capital market professionals, financial 
analysts, and institutional holders.  While switching away from selective disclosure, firms face two 
choices in the post-FD period: public disclosure and silence (a change in disclosure policy).  If full 
public disclosure is too costly for certain firms due to their competitive position and the value of 
their growth options (Albring, Banyi, Dhaliwal, & Pereira, 2015), these firms may choose to be 
silent.  Wang (2007) documents that over half of the firms that rely more on the selective disclosure 
channel in the pre-FD period have preferred to keep silent in the post-FD period (new non-
disclosers), while others have chosen to replace private guidance with public disclosure (new 
public disclosers).  Thus, Reg FD indicates a specific point of time when firms had to make a 
change in their disclosure policy. 
Many studies consider Reg FD’s impact on firms’ information environment and cost of 
equity (e.g., Duarte, Han, Harford, & Young, 2008; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Petacchi, 
2015) and document mixed evidence on the cost of equity for firms. After Reg FD, rating agencies 
and banks still have access to private information. Petacchi (2015) find that firms experiencing 
greater increase in information asymmetry after Reg FD further extended their debt financing.  
Thus, it is possible that the previously documented effect on the cost of equity may not be 
significant enough to have a meaningful influence on a firm’s overall weighted average cost of 
capital, and consequently may not result in a change in investment.  Hence, this study complements 
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prior literature by investigating directly whether a change in disclosure policy around Reg FD 
corresponds to a change in investment.  We find that a change in disclosure policy from private 
disclosure to silence is associated with an increase in the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its 
internally generated cash flow, indicating that the investments of these silent firms are more 
constrained in the post-FD period. 
To further disentangle the relation between a change in disclosure policy and capital 
investment, we conduct several cross-sectional tests considering other factors that may affect this 
relation such as ex-ante financial constraints, a firm’s growth opportunity, its external information 
environment, and its access to an alternative financing channel.  
With regard to ex-ante financial constraints, theory suggests that in the presence of 
information asymmetry, firms have to rely on collateral to borrow in the credit market.  When a 
macroeconomic shock reduces collateral value, financially constrained firms would reduce 
investment more than the unconstrained ones, which suggests an increase in the importance of 
information asymmetry for the former firms (e.g., Beatty, Liao, & Weber, 2010; Whited & Wu, 
2006).  We employ a financial constraint index developed by Whited and Wu (2006) to partition 
firms into financially constrained and unconstrained groups respectively.  The results show that, 
relative to new public disclosers, albeit in the financially constrained group only, new non-
disclosers are associated with a larger increase in investment cash flow sensitivity.  This effect 
does not exist for the financially unconstrained group.  
Next, we investigate the influence of growth opportunity on the relation between disclosure 
policy and investment.  As the information problem increases with investment potential, cash flow 
sensitivity should be higher for firms with more investment opportunities (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
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Consistent with this, only in the subsample of high-growth firms, the investment of new non-
disclosers are more constrained relative to new public disclosers.  No difference exists between 
these two groups in the subsample of low-growth firms.  
Third, we also examine the impact of the external information environment.  When the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is severe, external financing is more costly.  
We use a change in the number of analysts from the pre-FD to post-FD period as a proxy for the 
external information environment, and find that the increase in cash flow sensitivity for new non-
disclosers is more pronounced in the subsample of firms that experience a decline in analyst 
coverage, but not in the subsample with an increase.  These results suggest that investment 
constraints can be alleviated from an alternative information source. 
Finally, we consider the importance of an alternative financing channel.  Reg FD mainly 
affects the disclosure channel on the equity market.  In the post-FD period, banks and rating 
agencies still have superior access to the private information of borrowers.  Petacchi (2015) find 
that firms increase debt financing after Reg FD.  We predict that only the new non-disclosers that 
have difficulty in issuing long-term debt suffer investment constraints, while those with access to 
the debt market do not experience investment restrictions.  The results are consistent with our 
prediction. 
In sum, these findings demonstrate that a switch from private disclosure channel to silence 
is associated with more investment constraints, and the association is attenuated by other firm 
characteristics.  In further analyses, we attempt to draw some causal inference between a change 
in disclosure policy and investment constraints by employing an endogenous switching estimation, 
which addresses pre-FD private disclosers’ choice of public disclosure versus silence in the post-
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FD period.  Following Wang (2007), we consider the determinants of disclosure choice in the first-
stage selection model.  Then we estimate the second-stage investment models respectively for 
firms that switched from selective disclosure to public disclosure, and firms that chose to be silent.  
The results are qualitatively similar to the main findings, which can shed some light on the impact 
of disclosure policy on investment constraints. However, we also acknowledge that due to the 
difficulty in identifying perfect instruments, we need to be cautious about the causal influence.  
In addition, to address the concern that the observed investment cash flow sensitivity may 
be due to measurement errors in growth opportunity (Erickson & Whited, 2000), we employ an 
alternative model: cash to cash flow sensitivity.  Only constrained firms display a systematic 
propensity to save cash out of cash flows since in the absence of financing constraints, the change 
in the cash balance should not be correlated with investment opportunities (Almeida, Campello, & 
Weisbach, 2004).  The results are qualitatively the same as our main findings.  Silent firms tend to 
hoard more cash in the post-FD period, which is a signal of investment constraints. 
The study contributes to the literature along two dimensions.  First, it complements the 
research on a firm’s voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity.  Leuz and Wysocki (2008) state 
that evidence on the cross-sectional relation between a firm’s voluntary disclosure, accounting 
attributes, and cost of capital is still evolving, rendering it difficult to draw unambiguous 
conclusions about whether better information quality reduces the cost of capital (e.g., Botosan, 
1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). In 
addition, prior research focuses on a specific financing channel, namely the cost of equity capital.  
If one financing channel is inefficient, then other channels such as debt, private financing, state 
subsidies, and intra-group capital transfers can function as substitutes.  In equilibrium, there may 
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not be any difference in investment constraints at the firm level, but simply cross-sectional 
differences in financing patterns.  Therefore, examining the effect of disclosure on investment is 
equivalent to examining its effect on the quantity of capital provided (as opposed to the price), 
which can shed light on the impact of disclosure regulation on the overall cost of capital, and 
circumvent the problems associated with the cost of capital literature (Frederickson & Hilary, 
2006).  Our finding that a change in disclosure policy is associated with a firm’s investment 
constraints contributes new evidence to the research on overall cost of capital. 
Second, this study extends research on financial transparency and investment.  A growing 
field of research indicates that better accounting quality reduces information asymmetry and 
enhances investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Biddle, Hilary, & Verdi, 2009; 
Khurana et al., 2006; Schleicher, Tahoun, & Walker, 2010; Shroff, Verdi, & Yu, 2013).2  This 
study extends this line of research to voluntary disclosure while complementing the early studies.  
Khurana et al. (2006) use the analyst ratings of overall firm disclosures from 1984 to 1994. They 
find a positive relation between firm disclosure policy and the externally financed growth rate.  
One caveat of their study is that analyst ratings on firms’ disclosure quality are only available for 
a small sample of large and heavily followed firms in an industry, and thus is subject to selection 
bias (Lang & Lundholm, 1993).  Furthermore, these ratings were discontinued after 1995.  
However, management forecasts increased dramatically after the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act was implemented in 1995.  Hence, our study fills the gap, and provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relation between disclosure and investment. 
                                                 
2 Shroff et al. (2013) show that the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
European Union countries reduces investment to cash flow sensitivity in those countries, especially for small firms 
and firms operating in insider economies. Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that higher accrual quality reduces the 
sensitivity of firms’ investment to internally generated cash flow.   
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The next section discusses the related literature and the research question.  Section III 
discusses the variable construction and empirical models.  Section IV describes the empirical 
findings, and Section V discusses additional tests and robustness checks.  Section VI concludes 
the paper. 
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the absence of information problems, managers engage in capital investment until the 
marginal return is zero.  Internally generated cash flow should be irrelevant to investment 
decisions; management should make capital investment decisions based solely on the firm’s 
growth opportunities.  However, given information asymmetry (both adverse selection and moral 
hazard) between managers and outside capital suppliers, firms may face financing frictions that 
cause them to rely on internally generated funds to finance their investment (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that adverse selection leads to capital rationing or a higher 
cost of external financing.  If a firm’s manager has private information about the profitability of a 
new investment opportunity, then they will have a strong incentive to issue overvalued securities.  
Expecting this, investors will either require a price premium, or will employ capital rationing.  
Thus, adverse selection potentially reduces a firm’s ability to finance new projects with external 
capital, and it has to use internal funds instead.  Any shortage of internal cash flow in such a firm 
can lead to an underinvestment problem (Schleicher et al., 2010).  Regarding moral hazard, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that since external financing reduces the amount of equity held by 
managers, they would have more incentive to exploit investor wealth instead.  For example, 
managers may pursue perquisite consumption and empire building rather than return excess capital 
to investors (e.g., Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Jensen, 1986). To counteract this, ex-ante, investors will 
9 
 
require a higher rate of return to compensate for the costly ex-post monitoring of managerial 
actions.  Therefore, in both the moral hazard and adverse selection cases, if information asymmetry 
is severe, the cost of external financing will be high, and the firm’s capital investment will be 
highly correlated with its internal cash flow.  Thus, a firm’s level and change in cash flow 
sensitivity of investment are related to the extent of the firm’s information problem. 
Extant theory posits that an expanded and credible disclosure policy serves to improve a 
firm’s access to external capital by mitigating information asymmetry and agency conflicts (e.g., 
Bushman & Smith, 2001; Verrecchia, 1983). The quality of financial disclosure can enhance 
economic performance by reducing adverse selection, which attracts more funds into capital 
markets, and lowers the cost of capital.  It can also ensure the efficient management of assets in 
place, enable better project selection, and reduce the expropriation of investor wealth by managers 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001).  Empirical evidence is consistent with these theoretical predictions.  
Researchers document that greater disclosure is associated with tighter bid–ask spreads (Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000; Welker, 1995), a lower cost of equity (Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 
2002), and a higher realized growth rate (Khurana et al., 2006).  Therefore, a change in disclosure 
policy can affect a firm’s information asymmetry, which can influence the firm’s access to external 
capital markets. 
Reg FD is an external shock to a firm’s information environment.  In the pre-FD period, 
firms had discretion in determining both the content of information, and the disclosure channel.  
In the post-FD period, firms have been deprived of the private disclosure channel, and can only 
decide whether to disclose, and how much to disclose.  Hence, firms were forced to change their 
disclosure policy.  Despite its benefits, public disclosure can be costly, particularly for firms in 
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competitive industries, or with valuable growth options.  Public disclosure may reveal critical 
information to competitors, causing firms to lose competitive advantages, and face a more severe 
threat of entry (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000).  Additional disclosure can also lead to a decrease in 
the expected profits of insider trading, while a manager’s residual moral hazard problem may 
increase (Baiman & Verrecchia, 1996). 
Responding to differential costs in public disclosure, Wang (2007) documents that some 
private disclosers have chosen to replace private guidance with public disclosure (new public 
disclosers), while others have preferred to keep silent in the post-FD period (new non-disclosers).  
The author also finds that a change from the private disclosure to the non-disclosure policy leads 
to a deterioration of the information environment for these new non-disclosers.  Relative to new 
public disclosers, these firms experience steeper decrease in analyst following, larger increase in 
forecast dispersion, and greater market reactions to their earnings releases in the post-FD period. 
Therefore, Reg FD pins down a specific time at which firms must make a disclosure choice 
between a public channel and silence, which provides a good setting to examine corresponding 
changes in their investment. 
Related to the consequences of disclosure changes induced by Reg FD, many studies 
document mixed evidence of Reg FD on firms’ cost of equity capital (e.g., Chen, Dhaliwal, & Xie, 
2010; Duarte et al., 2008; Gomes, Gorton, & Madureira, 2007).  Additionally, after Reg FD, rating 
agencies and banks still have access to firms’ private information.  Consistent with this, Petacchi 
(2015) finds that firms increase their debt issuance after Reg FD, especially those with greater 
information asymmetry.  If one financing channel (equity) is inefficient, then other channels (e.g., 
debt, private financing, state subsidies, and intra-group capital transfers) can serve as substitutes.  
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In equilibrium, we may not observe any change in a firm’s real operations, just cross-sectional 
differences in its financing pattern.  Therefore, it is unclear, and hence interesting to examine 
whether Reg FD affects a firm’s ultimate investment.  
This study is closely related to research on the effect of accounting quality on investment 
efficiency.  Biddle et al. (2009) show that firms with higher financial quality deviate less from 
predicted investment levels, and display less sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions.  In addition, 
Beatty, Liao, et al. (2010) show that the impact of accounting quality can be alleviated through 
private information and direct monitoring from banks.  Further, Shroff et al. (2013) document that 
the effect of accounting quality on investment constraints can be mitigated by firms’ external 
information environment.  Biddle et al. (2009) and Balakrishnan, Core, and Verdi (2014) employ 
an exogenous shock to firms’ information environment—adoption of IFRS, and an increase in the 
value of a firm’s real estate assets—and find that reporting quality can substitute for collateral in 
mitigating information asymmetry associated with underinvestment.  However, few studies 
examine the effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ investment, except for the early study of 
Khurana et al. (2006).  Thus, our study fills the gap, and aims to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relation between disclosure and investment. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Beatty, Liao, et al., 2010; Fazzari et al., 1988), we 
investigate changes in investment to cash flow sensitivities between new public disclosers and new 
non-discloser pre-FD versus post-FD.  A difference-in-differences test of cash flow sensitivity 
between different disclosure groups (pre-FD versus post-FD) mitigates some concerns about 
confounding events around Reg FD. 
12 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Sample Selection 
We have selected firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices, COMPUSTAT, 
and I/B/E/S, with data available from 1996 to 1999 for the pre-FD period, and from 2001 to 2003 
for the post-FD period.  We also use the First Call’s Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database 
for management forecasts.  Institutional ownership data are from Thomas Reuters Institutional 
Holdings database (13F).  We exclude firms in regulated and quasi-regulated industries,3 and 
truncate the major variables at the 1% and 99% levels.4  The sample period begins in 1996 because 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which provides broader safe harbor provisions for 
forward-looking voluntary disclosures, became effective in December 1995, and prior research 
finds that management-provided earnings guidance became pervasive in the mid-1990s (Brown & 
Pinello, 2011). 
3.2. Deriving Private Earnings Guidance 
To explore the impact of Reg FD on a firm’s capital investment constraints related to 
disclosure policy changes, we first partition firms based on their disclosure behaviors around Reg 
FD.  Following Wang (2007), to identify pre-FD private disclosers, we first extract a firm’s total 
earnings guidance and derive private earnings guidance therefrom, teasing out factors that 
contribute to the predictability of earnings, including earnings volatility, incidence of losses, and 
number of earnings-related public disclosures.  We then classify firms as private (public) disclosers 
                                                 
3We exclude Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000–6999 (financial institutions), 4800–4999 (utilities), 
4000–4499 (transportations), as well as 8000 and higher. 
4 Winsorization at the 1% and 99% level yields similar results. 
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depending on their stronger reliance on private (public) channels in the pre-FD period (1996–
1999); we further divide private disclosers into post-FD new public disclosers (those who replace 
private guidance with public disclosure), and post-FD new non-disclosers (those who replace 
private guidance with silence in the post-FD period)5 (see details in online Appendix)6.  After 
restricting each firm-quarter to have available financial data for tests, we have 4,730 firm-quarters 
for new non-disclosers, and 2,640 for new public disclosers.  
3.3. Investment to Cash Flow Sensitivity Test 
We examine the association between firms’ capital investment constraints and their change 
in disclosure policy around Reg FD by comparing investment to cash flow sensitivity before and 
after Reg FD.  As mentioned, pre-FD private disclosers can choose to replace private guidance 
with public disclosure, or stop disclosing in the post-FD period.  We apply a difference-in-
differences design to alleviate the possibility of other confounding events around the time Reg FD 
was implemented.  The sample only includes pre-FD private disclosers with information available 
for the whole sample period (from 1996 to 1999 for the pre-FD period, and from 2001 to 2003 for 
post-FD).  The models are as follows: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 
+𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀 (1) 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 
                                                 
5 The term post-FD new public disclosers is used interchangeably with new public disclosers, and post-FD new non-
disclosers is used interchangeably with new non-disclosers. 
6 Table A.1 of the online Appendix provides the results of replicating Wang (2007)’s study. 
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+𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼9𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼11𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼12𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼13𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼14𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀 (2) 
Eq. (1) is the baseline model, and Eq. (2) contains additional control variables that may 
potentially affect firms’ investment.  We estimate Eq. (1) separately for new public disclosers and 
new non-disclosers across the whole sample period.  We set FD equal to one for the post-FD 
period, and zero for the pre-FD period.  Consistent with other research, we measure capital 
investment (INVESTMENT) as capital expenditure in the current quarter, scaled by net property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE).7  Cash flow  
(CFO ) is computed as cash flow from operations scaled by net PPE.8  To address our research 
question, we compare the coefficients of FDCFO   between two groups of disclosers (new 
public disclosers versus new non-disclosers).  In contrast to new public disclosers, if new non-
disclosers experience higher cash flow sensitivity pre-FD versus post-FD, then we would expect 
the coefficient of FDCFO   to be higher for new non-disclosers than for new public disclosers. 
To disentangle the relation between a change in disclosure policy and a firm’s cash flow 
sensitivity, we control for other factors that may potentially affect a firm’s investment.  In Eq. (1), 
we control for firm size, capital structure, and growth opportunity.  SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of one plus total assets, and LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  Smaller firms 
and firms with higher leverage tend to have fewer investment (Beatty, Liao, et al., 2010).  The 
                                                 
7 Instead of using the level of capital expenditure as a proxy for investment, we use changes in capital expenditure as 
well as the sum of capital expenditure and research and development (R&D) expenses, and the results still hold. 
8 We also run a sensitivity test using CF (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization) scaled 
by net PPE, as Fazzari et al. (1988), and the results are robust to this measure. 
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variable TOBINQ represents a firm’s growth opportunities, calculated as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, scaled by the book value of assets.  
We expect a firm’s investment to be positively related to its growth opportunities. 
The extended model, Eq. (2), contains additional control variables.  Firms with more 
tangible and liquid assets can sell these assets to fund new investment projects, if needed, and are 
thus less likely to experience financial constraints.  Following Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) and 
Almeida and Campello (2007), we compute a firm-level proxy, TANGIBILITY9, for expected value 
of assets in liquidation.  Similarly, we control for the beginning period cash balance, LAGCASH.  
Prior research finds that cash balance tends to be positively associated with future investment 
opportunities (e.g., Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999).  
In addition, a firm’s performance, ROE, may also affect its capital investment, where ROE is 
defined as net income divided by average equity.  More profitable firms may invest more in the 
future.  Besides profitability, a firm’s competitive status and sales growth can also affect its 
investment.  Thus, we include the quarterly industry Herfindahl index (COMPETITION) for a 
firm’s three-digit SIC code, and a firm’s quarterly sales growth (SALESGROWTH).  We also 
control for a firm’s financial condition (DIV) and other related uses of funds (RD).  The variable 
DIV is an indicator variable that equals one if there is any cash dividend in a given quarter, and 
zero otherwise.  Constrained firms are less likely to issue dividends.  The variable RD is a firm’s 
quarterly R&D expenditure scaled by total assets.  Constrained firms must tradeoff among 
                                                 
9  The variable TANGIBILITY is computed as per Berger et al. (1996) and Almeida and Campello (2007): 
0.715accounts receivable + 0.547inventory + 0.535PP&E + cash divided by total assets. Berger et al. (1996) gather 
data on the proceeds from discontinued operations reported by a sample of COMPUSTAT firms over the 1984 to 1993 
period, and find that a dollar of book value yields, on average, 72 cents in exit value for total receivables, 55 cents for 
inventory, and 54 cents for fixed assets.  Almeida and Campello (2007) document that pledgeable assets support more 
borrowing, which allows for further investment. 
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different uses of limited funds.  Finally, we include the ex-ante financial constraint measure FC as 
developed by Whited and Wu (2006)10.  Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A.  Firms’ fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered at firm and year–quarter 
levels. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides comparable descriptive statistics for firms based on their disclosure 
policy, i.e., for new public disclosers and new non-disclosers.  Panel A shows the industry 
distribution based on the Fama–French 10-industry classification.  About 20% of the new non-
disclosers are in the healthcare, medical equipment, and drug industries which have relatively 
higher proprietary costs associated with public disclosure.  Meanwhile, over a third of new public 
disclosers operate in the business equipment and information technology industries, where 
managers need to attract more funds by lowering the cost of capital. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the comparative firm characteristics.  Generally, compared to 
new non-disclosers, new public disclosers are larger in size (SIZE), and have better accounting 
performance (ROE).  They also maintain lower tangible assets (TANGIBILITY), and release more 
cash dividends (DIV).  New non-disclosers experience a larger decrease in investment post-FD.  
They also experience a higher increase in leverage (LEVERAGE) from the pre-FD to the post-FD 
period.  In addition, new non-disclosers maintain higher cash balance (LAGCASH), which 
                                                 
10 Section 4.4.2 provides a detailed description. 
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indicates that these firms may rely more on their internal cash flow to fund their investment 
opportunities. 
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
4.2. Main Results  
Table 2 provides the results from the investment to cash flow sensitivity test between new 
non-disclosers and new public disclosers from pre-FD to post-FD for the baseline and extended 
models respectively.  In columns (1 & 2) of the baseline model, the coefficient of CFO reflects 
investment to cash flow sensitivity in the pre-FD period, while the coefficient of FDCFO 
reflects a change in cash flow sensitivity for the sample firms pre-FD versus post-FD.  For new 
non-disclosers, the coefficient of CFO does not appear to be statistically significant, indicating 
that these firms may not have experienced financial constraints in the pre-FD period.  However, 
the coefficient of FDCFO   is 0.007 and significant at the 5% level, which shows that a change 
in disclosure policy from selective disclosure to non-disclosure is associated with an increase in 
cash flow sensitivity for these firms.  For new public disclosers, both the coefficients of CFO and 
FDCFO  are statistically insignificant, suggesting that a change from selective disclosure to 
public disclosure has no influence on these firms’ capital investment.  The difference in the 
coefficients of FDCFO  between these two groups is 0.009 at significant the 5% level.  A one 
standard deviation increase in cash flow (0.6) will increase new non-disclosers’ investment by 6% 
more than it would for new public disclosers.  The extended model displays similar results to the 
baseline model.  
Turning to the control variables in the extended model, we find that larger firms (SIZE), 
and firms with greater growth opportunities (TOBINQ) and better performance (ROE) have higher 
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investment levels, consistent with the findings in prior research.  In contrast, financially 
constrained firms (FC) are associated with lower investment.  Collectively, the evidence from 
Table 2 suggests that a change in disclosure policy from selective disclosure to non-disclosure 
corresponds to an increase in a firm’s investment constraints.11 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.3.  Cross-Sectional Tests 
4.3.1. Impact of Financial Constraints. 
Theoretical works suggest that the adverse selection issue forces firms to leverage collateral 
to borrow capital from the credit market (Bernanke & Gertler, 1986; Carlstrom & Fuerst, 1997). 
When macroeconomic shocks reduce collateral value, financially constrained firms reduce 
investment more than the unconstrained ones (Whited & Wu, 2006).  There is consistent empirical 
evidence that the investment to cash flow sensitivity measure behaves differently between 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms (e.g., Beatty, Scott Liao, & Weber, 2010). If the 
existence of ex-ante financial constraints suggests an increase in the importance of information 
asymmetry problems, then disclosure quality would have a greater influence for financially 
constrained firms. Frederickson and Hilary (2006) document that oil-dependent firms that had a 
higher level of disclosure quality prior to the negative oil price shock in 1986 experienced a smaller 
decrease in their non-oil segment capital investment.  The authors find that financially constrained 
                                                 
11 In sensitivity tests, we use other disclosure groups (public disclosers and non-disclosers) as control groups to further 
examine the relation between disclosure policy and investment to cash flow sensitivity.  Untabulated results show no 
difference in investment constraints between public disclosers and new public disclosers pre-FD versus post-FD.  
However, relative to non-disclosers, new non-disclosers generally experience a higher increase in investment 
constraints.  These firms rely on the private channel in the pre-FD period, and become silent in the post-FD period. 
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firms receive greater benefit from better disclosure quality. Therefore, we expect a disclosure 
policy that affects a firm’s information environment to be more closely related to investment of 
ex-ante financially constrained firms.  We employ the index developed by Whited and Wu (2006), 
which does a better job of sorting constrained firms than the other indexes do, and has been used 
in many subsequent studies (e.g., Beatty, Scott Liao, et al., 2010; Li, 2011)12.  The index is 
computed as a function of a firm’s cash flow, dividend policy, leverage, size, and sales growth, 
which are informative about the firm’s external financial demands: 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = −0.091 × 𝐶𝐹𝑡 − 0.062 × 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 0.021 × 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 − 0.044 × 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 0.102 ×
𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑡 − 0.035 × 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 (3) 
The variable ISG is sales growth in a firm’s three-digit SIC code, and CF is the ratio of 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation to total assets.  The remaining variables are 
identical to those in the main regressions.  We partition firms based on the FC index, and classify 
financially constrained firms as those with an FC index above the sample median.  Firms with an 
FC index below the sample median are defined as financially unconstrained.  We then conduct the 
same tests for financially constrained and unconstrained firms respectively.13  
Table 3 presents the results for financially constrained (above the median) and 
unconstrained (below the median) firms.  For financially constrained firms, the coefficient of 
FDCFO   for new-non disclosers is 0.009 and significant at the 5% level, which suggests that 
for financially constrained firms, a change in disclosure policy is significantly associated with an 
                                                 
12 The index outperforms the one developed in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in identifying financially constrained 
firms, and is consistent with firm characteristics associated with external finance constraints (Whited & Wu, 2006).  
13 We also rank the FC index into quartiles for all firms in the sample.  Firms in the upper quartile of the FC index are 
defined as financially constrained, while the remaining firms are defined as unconstrained. The results are robust to 
this partition.  
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increase in a firm’s cash flow sensitivity.  In comparison, the investment of firms that switch to 
public disclosure is largely unchanged.  The difference in the coefficients of FDCFO   between 
these two groups is 0.016 and significant at the 5% level.  A one standard deviation increase in 
cash flow (0.60) will increase the investment of new non-disclosers by 11% more than it would 
for new public disclosers.  However, ex-ante financially unconstrained firms do not exhibit 
significant differences in the coefficients of FDCFO  between different disclosure groups.  In 
sum, these results indicate that the relation between disclosure policy and capital investment 
constraints is driven by financially constrained firms, which further strengthens our main findings 
in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.3.2. Impact of Growth Opportunity. 
We also consider the impact of growth opportunity on the relation between disclosure and 
investment constraints, since only firms with good investment opportunities need to invest enough 
to be constrained (Whited & Wu, 2006).  Additionally, when information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders is high, costs associated with external financing are greater. As this problem 
increases with investment opportunities, cash flow sensitivity should be higher for firms with more 
investment opportunities (Fazzari et al., 1988).  We expect the association between disclosure 
policy and investment constraints to be greater for firms with more growth opportunities.  We 
partition firms based on Tobin’s Q, and classify high-growth firms as those with Tobin’s Q above 
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the sample median, and low-growth firms as those below the sample median.14  We then rerun the 
tests for both the subsamples.  The results are reported in Table 4 for low-growth firms (below the 
median) in columns (1 & 2), and for high-growth firms (above the median) in columns (3 & 4)15.  
We find that disclosure policy only matters for high-growth firms.  Specifically, the coefficients 
of FDCFO  for new-non disclosers are positive, 0.01 and significant at 5% level, and the 
difference in the coefficients between these two disclosure groups is also positive and significant, 
which indicates that a change in disclosure policy is only related to investment of a firm with 
higher growth potential.   
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.3.3. Impact of External Information Environment. 
We also consider the influence of the external information environment.  When information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is severe, external financing is costlier.  Analyst 
coverage can mitigate to some extent the information problem. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest 
that analysts, as information intermediaries, engage in private information production that 
improves the information environment and helps detect managers’ misconduct.  Consistent with 
this, Yu (2008) finds that firms that are followed by a large number of analysts engage less in 
earnings manipulation, and Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) document that analysts are the most 
efficient external whistleblowers for corporate fraud.  Therefore, analyst coverage could measure 
                                                 
14 We also rank the Tobin’s Q into quartiles for all firms in the sample. Firms in the upper quartile of the Tobin’s Q 
are defined as high-growth, while the remaining firms are defined as low-growth. The results are robust to this 
partition. 
15 The median of TOBINQ for different disclosure groups is very similar (1.398 vs.1.396), so the sample distribution 




to some extent the quality of external information environment. If analysts can substitute for 
management disclosure, then a non-disclosure policy may not be necessarily associated with a 
firm’s investment.  We use a change in analyst following around Reg FD as a proxy for the external 
information environment and rerun the tests.   
Table 5 presents the results for the subsample of firms with decrease (increase) in analyst 
coverage in the post-FD period.  We find that only when analyst coverage declines, the coefficient 
of FDCFO  for new non-disclosers is positive, 0.009 and significant at 5% level.  When the 
number of analysts increase, the coefficient of FDCFO is positive but insignificant.  However, 
for new public disclosers, a change in analyst following has no association with their cash flow 
sensitivities.  These results suggest that investment constraints associated with management 
disclosure can be mitigated by the information production from analysts. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
4.3.4. Impact of an Alternative Financing Channel. 
Finally, we consider the importance of an alternative financing channel.  Reg FD mainly 
affects the disclosure practice on the equity market.  In the post-FD period, banks and rating 
agencies still have superior access to private information of borrowers.  Petacchi (2015) find that 
firms increase debt financing after Reg FD.  If silent firms can acquire enough funding from the 
debt market, then their investment should not be affected.  We partition the sample firms based on 
the change in long-term debt issuance around Reg FD, and rerun the tests.  Table 6 displays the 
results for the subsample of firms with a decrease (increase) in long-term debt issuance in the post-
FD period.  Only those new non-disclosers that have difficulties issuing new debt have a positive 
coefficient of , 0.009 and significant at 5% level, which suggests that these firms suffer investment 
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constraints, while those with access to the debt market do not experience investment restriction.  
In contrast, an alternative debt financing channel has no effect on the investment constraints for 
new public disclosers.  The results suggest that our main findings are driven by new non-disclosers 
that are harder to access the debt market. 
 [Insert Table 6 Here] 
V. FURTHER ANALYSES 
5.1. Endogenous Switching Model 
In the previous section, we compare cash flow sensitivity between new public disclosers 
and new non-disclosers to investigate the association between a change in disclosure policy and a 
firm’s capital investment constraints.  In further analysis, we attempt to draw some causal 
inference by addressing the endogeneity issue embedded in the choice of disclosure policy.  In the 
post-FD period, firms had to switch away from the private disclosure channel.  However, private 
disclosure firms face a choice: public disclosure versus silence.  This choice is likely to be 
endogenously determined with investment decisions, thus potentially biasing ordinary lease square 
(OLS) coefficient estimates.  To account for the endogeneity, and to shed some light on the causal 
effect of disclosure policy change, we use endogenous switching estimation that requires an 
exogenous instrument—a variable that is related to the firm's disclosure choice, but is not directly 
related to its investment decisions.  Endogenous switching estimation allows the coefficients to 
differ in the treatment and control groups.  We prefer it to the traditional Heckman approach as we 
are interested in both choice regimes, and intend to draw a conclusion for each.  
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The first-stage model captures the determinants of a firm’s disclosure choice.  The second-
stage model estimates investment decisions separately for new public disclosers and new non-
disclosers.  We then use a full information maximum likelihood method, and estimate these models 
simultaneously. 
The first-stage selection model includes factors that affect firms’ disclosure choices.  Firms 
with higher proprietary costs, as proxied by R&D expenditure (RD), are more likely to face more 
costs of public disclosure (Wang, 2007).  For firms in competitive industries or with valuable 
growth options, public disclosure can adversely affect their competitive position and the value of 
their growth options (Albring et al., 2015).  Thus, we include the quarterly industry Herfindahl 
index (COMPETITION) and a firm’s quarterly sales growth (SALESGROWTH) in the selection 
model.  Following Wang (2007), we further control for a firm’s financial condition by including 
the dividend policy (DIV). 
In addition, we include two instrumental variables, INSTITUTION_IND_D and 
FORECAST_IND, in the first-stage determinant model.  Both instruments are measured at the 
industry–quarter level, excluding the firm’s own value.  The variable INSTITUTION_IND_D 
equals one if the industry average institutional ownership is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise, while FORECAST_IND captures the industry median forecast frequency.  Prior 





ownership (e.g., Bushee & Noe, 2000).  Both instruments proxy for a firm’s external information 
environment, which can affect a firm’s own disclosure decisions, but are unlikely to directly affect 
its investment policy.  Therefore, these two variables can be potential candidates for instrumental 
variables in the determinant model.  Next, we conduct the over-identification test to confirm the 
validity of the instruments. Finally, we also test and verify that the instrumental variable estimator 
differs significantly from the OLS estimator, and hence the instrumental variable approach is 
needed and appropriate. 
Table 7 Panel A presents the results of the first-stage disclosure choice model between 
public disclosure and silence in the post-FD period.  Larger firms and firms with greater growth 
opportunities are less likely to replace private guidance with silence.  In contrast, firms with higher 
cash balances and leverage are more likely to withhold information, since they rely less on the 
equity market to raise capital.  The two instrumental variables, the industry’s institutional 
ownership and forecast frequency, are significantly negatively associated with the choice of 
silence, which suggests that industry practices significantly affect a firm’s choice.  Panel B 
presents the results of the second-stage investment outcome model, which are qualitatively similar 
to our main findings in Table 2.  Specifically, in both the baseline and extended models, the 
coefficients of FDCFO for new non-disclosers are positive, 0.009 and significant at 5% level, 
while those for new public disclosers are positive but not significant.  The results suggest a causal 
link between disclosure change and a firm’s investment constraints.  However, we also 
acknowledge that the two instrumental variables as well as model specification may not be perfect, 
and thus may not address the endogeneity problem effectively, making it difficult to fully solve 
the endogeneity issue. Hence, we need to be cautious about the causal inference. 
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.2. Cash to Cash Flow Sensitivity Model 
Our interpretation of the relation between disclosure and investment is based on the 
existence of financial constraints.  There are concerns that the observed investment cash flow 
sensitivity may be due to measurement errors in growth opportunity (Alti, 2003).  Almeida et al. 
(2004) suggest using a firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash flows as an alternative measure 
of financial constraints.  Because cash is a financial variable, it is hard to argue that the explanatory 
power of cash flows over cash policies could be attributed to forecast future investment demand.  
Only firms anticipating financial constraints in the future hoard cash today, because holding cash 
is costly due to the reduction in current valuable investment.  Therefore, constrained firms must 
choose their optimal cash policy to balance the profitability of current and future investment.  
Financially unconstrained firms can take on all positive net present value projects.  They have no 
use for cash, and face no costs for holding cash.  Therefore, they should not display a systematic 
propensity to save cash out of cash flow.  Thus, cash to cash flow sensitivity provides a measure 
of the importance of financial constraints.  Numerous studies have employed this measure to 
capture the severity of a firm’s financial constraints (e.g., Beatty, Scott Liao, et al., 2010; Carlstrom 
& Fuerst, 1997; Stone, Gup, & Lee, 2018). 
 If a change in disclosure policy from selective disclosure to non-disclosure is associated 
with a firm’s financial constraints, then new non-disclosers would experience higher cash to cash 
flow sensitivity pre-FD versus post-FD, compared to new public disclosers.  We therefore propose 
the following model as in Almeida et al. (2004). 
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(5) 
where CASH is the change in the balance of cash and short-term marketable securities, scaled 
by lagged total assets.  The remaining variables are the same as in the previous investment to cash 
flow sensitivity model.  For detailed variable definitions, see . 
Table 8 reports the cash to cash flow sensitivity tests for both the OLS and the endogenous 
switching models.  Under the OLS estimation, for new non-disclosers, the coefficient of 
FDCFO   for new non-disclosers is 0.016 and significant at the 5% level, which shows that a 
change in disclosure policy from selective disclosure to non-disclosure is associated with an 
increase in these firms’ cash to cash flow sensitivity.  For new public disclosers, the coefficient of 
FDCFO   is statistically insignificant.  The difference in the coefficients of FDCFO   between 
these two groups is positive, 0.024 and significant at the 5% level.  A one standard deviation 
increase in cash flow (0.60) would increase the investment of new non-disclosers by 16% more 
than it would for new public disclosers.  The results from endogenous switching model provides 
similar inference.  These results are also consistent with the univariate test in Table 1 Panel B, 
wherein new non-disclosers significantly reduce cash dividends in the post-FD period compared 
to new public disclosers, which suggests that these firms need to cut shareholder payouts to hoard 
cash, a signal of more reliance on their internal cash.  In sum, compared to new public disclosers, 
new non-disclosers have higher cash to cash flow sensitivity pre-FD versus post-FD, further 
supporting our main findings. 
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[Insert Table 8 Here] 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the relation between a change in disclosure policy and a firm’s 
investment constraints.  The results show that, unlike new public disclosers, firms choosing to be 
silent experience more investment constraints in the post-FD period.  In addition, the association 
is stronger for firms that are ex-ante financially constrained, have greater growth opportunities, 
face a decrease in analyst following, and find it harder to raise debt.  These findings suggest that a 
change in disclosure policy induced by Reg FD is associated with a firm’s ultimate investment.  
In further analyses, we attempt to employ endogenous switching estimation methods to 
draw some causal inference. The results confirm with our main findings implying a causal link 
between a change in disclosure policy and investment constraints. However, due to the limitation 
of instrumental variable approach, we need to be cautious about this causal inference. We also 
conduct cash to cash flow sensitivity test, and find consistent results with our main findings. 
Our study sheds light on understanding the effect of a firm’s disclosure policy on its overall 
cost of capital, and also extends prior studies on financial transparency and investment efficiency.  
Our finding that disclosure policy is related to investment is relevant to both market participants 
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Capital expenditure (Compustat data capxy, adjusted for 
quarterly accumulation) scaled by net PPE (ppentq) 
CFO Cash flow from operations (oancfy, adjusted for quarterly 
accumulation) scaled by net PPE (ppentq) 
CF Income before extraordinary items (ibcy, adjusted for quarterly 
accumulation) plus depreciation and amortizations scaled by the 
prior period net PPE (ppentq) 
Cash  Changes in cash and short-term marketable securities (cheq) 
scaled by total assets (atq) at the beginning of the period 
Tobin’s Q  Market value of assets divided by the book value of assets 
)/)(( atqprccqcshoqceqqatq  at the beginning of the 
quarter 
LAGCASH     Cash balances (cheq) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
period 
LEVERAGE Ratio of long-term debt to total assets (lltq/atq) at the beginning of 
the quarter 
SIZE Natural logarithm of 1 plus total assets (log(1+atq)) 
ROE Net income (oiadpq) divided by average equity (ceqq) 
TANGIBILITY Almedia and Campello’s (2007) estimate: 0.715accounts 
receivable (rectq) + 0.547inventory (invtq) + 0.535PPE 
(ppentq) + cash divided by total assets (atq) 
FORECAST_IND Median of firms’ forecast frequency (sourced from I/B/E/S 
guidance) in the same industry–quarter 
INSTITUTION_IND__D        Indicator variable equal to 1 if the industry average institutional 
ownership is above the sample median and 0 otherwise 
RD Quarterly R&D expenses (xrdy adjusted for quarterly 
accumulation) divided by total assets (atq) 
COMPETITION Herfindahl competition index for a firm’s three-digit SIC code 
industry 
ISG Firm’s three-digit SIC code industry quarterly sales growth 
SALESGROWTH Changes in quarterly sales (saleq), scaled by sales at the beginning 
of the period 
DIV Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is any cash dividend in a 
given quarter and 0 otherwise 
FC Financial constraints index, as in Whited and Wu (2006): 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics of major variables (mean) 
 
New public disclosers New non-disclosers 
 
Pre-FD Post-FD Difference 
(Post - Pre) 
Pre-FD Post-FD Difference 
(Post - Pre) 
INVESTMENT 0.08 0.06 -0.02*** 0.09 0.05 -0.03*** 
CFO 0.06 0.07 0.01** 0.01 0.02 0.01** 
ΔCASH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** 
TOBINQ 2.00 1.61 -0.39*** 2.11 1.76 -0.35*** 
LEVERAGE 0.27 0.29 0.02* 0.24 0.31 0.07*** 
SIZE 6.18 6.59 0.41*** 4.96 5.08 0.12** 
ROE 0.05 0.02 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.02*** 
TANGIBILITY 0.51 0.48 -0.04*** 0.57 0.54 -0.03*** 
LAGCASH 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.23 0.22 -0.01 
COMPETITION 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 
SALESGROWTH 0.06 0.02 -0.04*** 0.08 0.05 -0.03** 
RD 0.02 0.01 -0.00* 0.03 0.02 0.00 
DIV 0.37 0.34 -0.02 0.22 0.18 -0.04*** 
FC -0.29 -0.30 -0.02*** -0.22 -0.23 0.00 
This table provides descriptive statistics of major variables used in the study (pre-FD, 1996–1999; post-FD, 2001–
2003). The symbols, ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions.  
Panel A: Industry distribution        
Fama–French 10-industry code New public disclosers  New non-disclosers 
 Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Consumer Nondurables—Food, Tobacco 154 5.84  418 8.84 
Consumer Durables—Cars, TV's 152 5.76  67 1.4 
Manufacturing—Machinery, Trucks 571 21.65  987 20.89 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction  128 4.85  268 5.66 
Business Equipment—Computers 965 37.5  969 20.51 
Telephone and Television Transmission  0 0  40 0.83 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 232 8.79  377 7.93 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 95 3.6  929 19.67 
Other—Mines, Constr, BldMt, and Trans 343 13  675 14.28 
      





Investment to cash flow sensitivity between new public disclosers and new non-disclosers 
 









     
CFO -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 (-0.731) (0.243) (-0.387) (0.847) 
FD -0.028*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.021*** 
 (-5.950) (-4.944) (-6.059) (-4.906) 
CFO×FD 0.007** -0.002 0.008** -0.004 
 (2.052) (-0.453) (2.313) (-0.851) 
TOBINQ 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 
 (4.137) (5.642) (4.277) (5.558) 
LEVERAGE -0.022** -0.044*** -0.010 -0.033** 
 (-2.281) (-2.753) (-0.980) (-2.004) 
SIZE 0.013*** 0.003 0.011** 0.001 
 (2.711) (0.558) (2.134) (0.099) 
ROE   0.015** 0.023** 
   (2.238) (2.262) 
TANGIBILITY   0.029* -0.055** 
   (1.698) (-2.019) 
LAGCASH   0.074*** 0.111*** 
   (5.096) (3.209) 
COMPETITION   -0.032 -0.051 
   (-0.893) (-1.277) 
SALESGROWTH   0.003 -0.004 
   (0.906) (-0.793) 
RD   -0.151 0.042 
   (-1.606) (0.369) 
DIV   0.000 0.014** 
   (0.020) (2.099) 
FC   -0.061* -0.049** 
   (-1.680) (-2.033) 
     
     
Observations 4,730 2,640 4,730 2,640 
R2 0.319 0.416 0.342 0.437 
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 
 0.009**  0.012**  
This table displays the results of the investment to cash flow sensitivity tests (baseline model and extended model) 
over the sample period (pre-FD, 1996–1999; post-FD, 2001–2003). The dependent variable is INVESTMENT and FD 
is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed effects are included and 
standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and 





Impact of financial constraints on the effect of investment to cash flow sensitivity 
 
 Subsample partitioned on firms’ financial constraint (FC measure) 









     
CFO 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 0.010 
 (1.633) (-0.224) (-1.198) (1.270) 
FD -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.019** 
 (-3.573) (-5.001) (-4.545) (-2.205) 
CFO×FD 0.004 -0.009 0.009** -0.007 
 (0.769) (-0.853) (2.313) (-0.847) 
TOBINQ 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 
 (3.907) (3.926) (3.712) (4.059) 
LEVERAGE -0.012 -0.023 -0.004 -0.071*** 
 (-0.568) (-1.311) (-0.434) (-2.651) 
SIZE -0.005 -0.004 0.015** -0.004 
 (-0.518) (-0.533) (2.204) (-0.336) 
ROE -0.004 0.018* 0.019*** 0.025** 
 (-0.219) (1.712) (3.092) (2.091) 
TANGIBILITY -0.011 -0.017 0.035* -0.177*** 
 (-0.472) (-0.671) (1.674) (-2.781) 
LAGCASH 0.049 0.063* 0.075*** 0.192*** 
 (1.331) (1.907) (4.305) (3.243) 
COMPETITION 0.039 -0.041 -0.450* 0.080 
 (0.928) (-0.954) (-1.736) (1.605) 
SALESGROWTH 0.005 -0.014** 0.008 0.007 
 (0.991) (-1.991) (1.279) (0.880) 
RD 0.233* 0.318* -0.143 -0.117 
 (1.729) (1.706) (-1.351) (-0.791) 
DIV -0.003 0.012** 0.008 0.027 
 (-0.216) (2.311) (0.699) (1.565) 
FC -0.094 -0.020 -0.091** -0.110 
 (-0.908) (-0.566) (-2.021) (-1.504) 
     
Observations 1,908 1,797 2,822 843 
R2 0.463 0.497 0.331 0.418 
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 
 0.013  0.016**  
This table provides the results of the investment to cash flow sensitivity tests over the sample period (1996–1999 and 
2001–2003) for financially unconstrained firms (below the median of FC measure) and constrained firms (above the 
median of FC measure). The dependent variable is INVESTMENT and FD is an indicator variable equal to one for the 
post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at both the firm 
and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 





Impact of growth opportunity on the effect investment to cash flow sensitivity 
 
 This table provides the results of the investment to cash flow sensitivity test for the OLS model over the sample period 
(pre-FD, 1996–1999; post-FD, 2001–2003) for low-growth firms (Below the median) and high-growth firms (Above 
the median). A firm is high growth if its Tobin’s Q is above the median (i.e., larger magnitude). The dependent variable 
is INVESTMENT and FD is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed 
effects are included and standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Refer to Appendix A 
for variable definitions.  
  
 Subsample partitioned on firms’ growth opportunity ( TOBINQ  measure) 









     
CFO 0.007 0.004 -0.003 0.004 
 (1.604) (1.032) (-0.826) (0.568) 
FD -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (-4.884) (-3.518) (-4.803) (-4.328) 
CFO×FD -0.001 -0.001 0.010** -0.005 
 (-0.401) (-0.119) (2.145) (-0.635) 
TOBINQ 0.019** 0.045*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 (2.245) (3.844) (3.544) (3.862) 
LEVERAGE 0.001 -0.035 -0.007 -0.045** 
 (0.051) (-1.445) (-0.530) (-2.319) 
SIZE 0.003 0.015 0.019** -0.005 
 (0.528) (1.550) (2.494) (-0.727) 
ROE 0.008 0.029** 0.018*** 0.016 
 (0.581) (2.246) (2.802) (1.310) 
TANGIBILITY 0.002 -0.021 0.036* -0.103** 
 (0.078) (-1.085) (1.660) (-2.326) 
LAGCASH 0.114*** 0.042 0.062*** 0.128*** 
 (4.069) (1.149) (3.589) (2.989) 
COMPETITION 0.030 -0.023 -0.097 -0.079 
 (0.516) (-0.494) (-1.201) (-1.361) 
SALESGROWTH 0.005 -0.014** 0.004 0.000 
 (0.926) (-2.552) (0.921) (0.042) 
RD -0.119 0.233 -0.135 -0.115 
 (-0.537) (1.327) (-1.470) (-0.828) 
DIV -0.013 0.014* 0.024* 0.008 
 (-1.285) (1.901) (1.959) (0.793) 
FC -0.051 0.019 -0.051 -0.094** 
 (-1.510) (0.794) (-0.881) (-2.368) 
     
Observations 2,370 1,323 2,360 1,317 
R2 0.438 0.498 0.327 0.450 
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 




Impact of the change of analyst following after Reg-FD on investment to cash flow sensitivity 
 
 Subsample partitioned on the change of analyst following 









     
CFO 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.518) (0.888) (-1.060) (0.368) 
FD -0.036*** -0.019** -0.027*** -0.021*** 
 (-2.864) (-2.645) (-5.718) (-3.824) 
CFO×FD 0.012 -0.017 0.009** -0.001 
 (1.295) (-1.480) (2.410) (-0.113) 
TOBINQ 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 
 (3.015) (2.908) (3.502) (5.261) 
LEVERAGE -0.016 -0.059* -0.011 -0.005 
 (-0.670) (-1.840) (-1.075) (-0.309) 
SIZE 0.026** -0.008 0.004 0.017* 
 (2.532) (-1.294) (0.727) (1.999) 
ROE 0.005 0.023 0.018** 0.023** 
 (0.400) (1.081) (2.449) (2.715) 
TANGIBILITY 0.009 -0.022 0.046** -0.063** 
 (0.372) (-0.640) (2.067) (-2.240) 
LAGCASH 0.091** 0.100* 0.073*** 0.106*** 
 (2.515) (1.772) (3.516) (2.997) 
COMPETITION -0.020 0.016 -0.068 -0.092** 
 (-0.338) (0.342) (-1.526) (-2.181) 
SALESGROWTH 0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.484) (-0.700) (1.017) (-0.320) 
RD -0.125 0.014 -0.110 0.130 
 (-1.071) (0.081) (-1.076) (0.713) 
DIV 0.026 -0.004 -0.004 0.019** 
 (1.108) (-0.756) (-0.440) (2.489) 
FC -0.089 -0.067* -0.053 -0.040 
 (-1.420) (-1.926) (-1.502) (-1.537) 
     
Observations 956 1,003 3,774 1,637 
R2 0.300 0.402 0.360 0.482 
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 
 0.03  0.01**  
This table provides the results of the investment to cash flow sensitivity tests over the sample period (pre-FD, 1996–
1999; post-FD, 2001–2003) for firms with a change in analyst coverage around Reg FD. We compute the mean of the 
number of estimates one year before/after Reg-FD and use the change in the means to partition the sample into two 
sub-samples; that is, decrease in analyst following (i.e., less analyst following after FD) and increase in analyst 
following (i.e., more analyst following after FD). The dependent variable is INVESTMENT and FD is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed effects are included and standard errors 
are clustered at both the firm and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 6  
Impact of long-term debt issuance on the effect investment to cash flow sensitivity 
 
 Subsample partitioned on the long-term debt issuance 









     
CFO 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 
 (1.583) (-0.257) (-0.893) (1.166) 
FD -0.023*** -0.013* -0.028*** -0.025*** 
 (-4.411) (-1.971) (-4.833) (-4.607) 
CFO×FD 0.007 -0.013 0.009** -0.005 
 (0.880) (-0.875) (2.236) (-0.909) 
TOBINQ 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.006** 0.014*** 
 (3.758) (3.119) (2.698) (4.677) 
LEVERAGE 0.007 -0.007 -0.020* -0.044** 
 (0.464) (-0.317) (-1.896) (-2.230) 
SIZE 0.017* -0.004 0.006 0.003 
 (1.861) (-0.463) (1.045) (0.389) 
ROE 0.009 0.050** 0.017* 0.018* 
 (0.801) (2.252) (1.978) (1.755) 
TANGIBILITY 0.043** -0.047 0.029 -0.061* 
 (2.081) (-1.354) (1.289) (-1.773) 
LAGCASH 0.088*** 0.119* 0.071*** 0.114*** 
 (3.010) (1.741) (3.505) (2.948) 
COMPETITION -0.047 -0.024 -0.039 -0.061 
 (-0.835) (-0.725) (-0.796) (-0.920) 
SALESGROWTH 0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.007 
 (1.014) (0.138) (0.616) (-1.321) 
RD -0.122 -0.037 -0.150 0.100 
 (-0.781) (-0.171) (-1.447) (0.739) 
DIV -0.001 0.019** 0.002 0.012 
 (-0.173) (2.607) (0.175) (1.309) 
FC -0.068 -0.001 -0.056 -0.080** 
 (-1.104) (-0.045) (-1.665) (-2.743) 
     
Observations 1,784 897 2,946 1,743 
R2 0.393 0.499 0.318 0.417 
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 
 0.02  0.01***  
This table provides the results of the investment to cash flow sensitivity tests over the sample period (pre-FD, 1996–
1999; post-FD, 2001–2003) for firms with a change in long-term debt issuance. We compute differences in the long-
term debt issuance one year before/after Reg-FD and use the amount change to partition the sample into two sub-
samples; that is, a decrease in long-term debt issuance (i.e., less long-term debt issuance after FD) and an increase in 
long-term debt issuance (i.e., more long-term debt issuance after FD). The dependent variable is INVESTMENT and 
FD is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed effects are included 
and standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, 




Panel A: Determinants of the disclosure choice model between public disclosure and silence 
 Prob (Newnon = 1) Marginal effect 
   
CFO -0.114 -0.02 
 (-0.90)  
FD 0.052 0.01 
 (0.59)  
CFO×FD 0.073 0.01 
 (0.46)  
TOBINQ -0.130** -0.03 
 (-2.12)  
LEVERAGE 1.366*** 0.27 
 (2.81)  
SIZE -0.363*** -0.07 
 (-3.75)  
ROE -0.312 -0.06 
 (-1.07)  
TANGIBILITY 0.184 0.04 
 (0.23)  
LAGCASH 1.248* 0.24 
 (1.97)  
COMPETITION 1.839 0.36 
 (1.34)  
SALESGROWTH 0.314*** 0.06 
 (3.69)  
RD -0.706 -0.14 
 (-0.21)  
DIV 0.212 0.04 
 (0.72)  
FC 1.974*** 0.38 
 (2.58)  
INSTITUTION_IND_D -0.413** -0.08 
 (-2.09)  
FORECAST_IND -0.380*** -0.07 
 (-2.56)  
Constant 3.239***  
 (4.60)  
   
Observations 7,370  
Pseudo-R2 0.12  
   
Underidentification test Weak identification test Overidentification test 
χ2 = 7.75 with p-value = 0.02 
 
F-stat. = 39 with p-value < 
0.001 
χ2 = 0.74 with p-value = 0.39 
This table displays the results based on the endogenous switching model. The pre-FD sample period is 1996–1999 
and the post-FD sample period is 2001–2003. Panel A shows the results from the first-stage determinant model of 
disclosure choice. The dependent variable Newnon is an indicator variable equal to one if firms selected silence in the 
post-FD period and zero if they chose public disclosure. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year–quarter 
levels and z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variable  
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Table 7  
Panel B: Investment to cash flow sensitivity between new public disclosers and new non-disclosers 
Panel B displays the results from the second-stage investment outcome model. The dependent variable is 
INVESTMENT and FD is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed 
effects are included and standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Refer to Appendix A 
for variable definitions.  
  









     
CFO -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (-0.779) (-0.178) (-0.378) (-0.039) 
FD -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.026*** -0.021*** 
 (-5.147) (-3.922) (-4.869) (-3.170) 
CFO×FD 0.009** 0.002 0.009** 0.001 
 (2.266) (0.348) (2.361) (0.107) 
TOBINQ 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009* 0.006 
 (3.195) (2.896) (1.954) (1.478) 
LEVERAGE -0.040 -0.057** -0.027 -0.037 
 (-1.268) (-2.374) (-0.688) (-0.795) 
SIZE 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.029) (-0.439) (-0.032) (-0.358) 
ROE   0.011 0.020 
   (1.081) (1.319) 
TANGIBILITY   0.010 -0.036 
   (0.570) (-1.458) 
LAGCASH   0.066 0.073 
   (1.598) (1.255) 
COMPETITION   -0.005 -0.002 
   (-0.077) (-0.031) 
SALESGROWTH   0.005 -0.001 
   (0.534) (-0.056) 
RD   -0.161** -0.117 
   (-2.303) (-0.912) 
DIV   -0.012* -0.019*** 
   (-1.662) (-3.085) 
FC   -0.073 -0.042 
   (-1.195) (-0.896) 
     
     
Observations 4,730 2,640 4,730 2,640 
     
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 




Cash to cash flow sensitivity between new public disclosers and new non-disclosers 









     
CFO 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.019** 0.038*** 
 (3.173) (5.198) (2.206) (4.597) 
FD 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.394) (-0.048) (-0.108) (1.103) 
CFO×FD 0.016** -0.008 0.017** -0.001 
 (2.329) (-0.523) (2.357) (-0.056) 
TOBINQ 0.006* 0.008** 0.007 0.006** 
 (1.723) (2.285) (1.436) (2.527) 
LEVERAGE 0.012 -0.005 -0.004 0.016 
 (0.919) (-0.254) (-0.084) (1.633) 
SIZE 0.022*** 0.014** 0.009 0.001 
 (3.883) (2.370) (0.476) (0.293) 
ROE 0.010 -0.005 0.008 0.006 
 (1.216) (-0.429) (0.557) (0.608) 
TANGIBILITY 0.261*** 0.140*** 0.123*** 0.081*** 
 (4.958) (3.619) (4.094) (5.839) 
COMPETITION -0.053 -0.040 -0.039 0.004 
 (-1.121) (-1.052) (-0.511) (0.224) 
SALESGROWTH 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.006 
 (1.079) (0.572) (0.691) (0.806) 
RD -0.114 -0.344 -0.127* -0.034 
 (-1.092) (-1.149) (-1.737) (-0.378) 
DIV 0.010 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 
 (1.018) (-0.841) (0.030) (-0.184) 
FC -0.009 -0.018 -0.024 -0.009 
 (-0.180) (-0.503) (-0.400) (-0.231) 
Intercept -0.274*** -0.198*** -0.110*** -0.065* 
 (-4.468) (-8.064) (-7.084) (-1.666) 
     
Observations 4,730 2,640 4,730 2,640 
R2 0.148 0.152   
     
Differences in the coefficient of CFO×FD between new non-disclosers and new public disclosers 
 0.024**  0.018**  
This table provides the results of the cash to cash flow sensitivity test for both the OLS and endogenous switching 
models over the sample period (pre-FD, 1996–1999; post-FD, 2001–2003). The dependent variable is INVESTMENT 
and FD is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-FD period and zero otherwise. Firm fixed effects are included 
and standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year–quarter levels. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions 
 
 
 
